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Does Kabbala ever contradict the Poskim? If so, who must we follow? Adapted from Magen Avot, by Rabbi Mordechai Lebhar[1]
Having just celebrated the passing of Ribbi Shimon Bar Yohai, author of the Zohar, on Lag Ba’Omer, it is most appropriate to discuss the influence of Kabbala over the practice of Halacha. Many established Halachot and Minhagim are based on the teachings of Kabbala, which are recorded in the Zohar, Tikkunim, writings of the Arizal and many other sources. Yet, there seems to be a sense of confusion as to whether we follow the Kabbala or the Poskim, where they seem to clash. In this article we will give a general introduction to the matter, and hope to clarify some of the basic issues that pertain to the role of Kabbala in the world of Halacha.
Disputes Between the Talmud and the Zohar
Maran in the Bet Yosef[2], cites Poskim who maintain that one must recite two Berachot over the Tefillin – one for the hand and one for the head – as is the custom of the Ashkenazim. Maran quotes the Agur[3] who is startled as to why these Poskim do not follow the Zohar which implies that one should only recite one Beracha. Maran explains that this is not an issue, as there are many more examples in which the Zohar’s conclusion is not in line with the conclusion of the Talmud, and the Poskim still follow the Talmud. This, writes Maran, is not only because in some cases the Poskim may not have seen the words of the Zohar, but rather because, fundamentally, the practical Halacha must always follow our Talmud.
It seems that Maran is of the opinion that, unless the Zohar contradicts the Talmud’s conclusion, we will apply its rulings L’Halacha. Some examples of this include the ruling of the Shulhan Aruch that the knot of the hand Tefillin should not be detached from the Tefillin[4], that one does not wear Tefillin on Hol HaMo’ed[5], saying Hashem Melech twice[6] and many more.[7]
Issues Not Found in the Talmud
In the laws of Keriat Sefer Torah[8], Maran goes even further, stating in the Bet Yosef that despite the ruling of the Tosafot[9] and the Rosh[10], that the Oleh must read along with the Ba’al Koreh silently, it would seem that we must follow the apparent ruling of the Zohar not to read along whatsoever, even against the opinion of the Poskim – because it is not contradicted explicitly in the Talmud. Eventually, Maran explains the Zohar in a way that conforms with the ruling of the Poskim.
It would seem that the Bet Yosef is drawing a distinction between the Talmud and the Poskim. Whereas the rulings of the Talmud are absolutely binding, even against the Zohar, that is not the case with regards to rulings of the Poskim – in matters that are not mentioned in the Talmud. In the latter case, we must follow the Zohar.
The Kenesset HaGedola’s Doctrine
Ribbi Hayim Benveniste in Kenesset HaGedola[11], cited by the Mishna Berura[12], issues a detailed guideline as to when we follow the opinion of the Mekubalim and when we follow the opinion of the Poskim:
“Regarding any matter that there is a dispute between the Mekubalim and the Zohar and the Gemara and Poskim, we must follow the Gemara and the Poskim. If the Mekubalim assume a stricter position, we must be strict as well. If the matter is not mentioned in the Gemara and Poskim, even if it is mentioned in the [writings of] Kabbala, we cannot enforce the Kabbala’s position. If the Halacha is not contradicted in the Talmud or Poskim, we must follow the Kabbala. Similarly, if there is a dispute among the Poskim, the Kabbala will decide”.
This is also the opinion of the Radvaz.[13]
Hacham Ovadia Yosef זצ”ל in Yabia Omer[14] and Hacham Mordechai Eliyahu[15] זצ”לunderstand that these opinions are arguing on Maran. Whereas Maran in the laws of Keriat Sefer Torah is implying that we must follow the Zohar against the Poskim in a matter that is not discussed in the Talmud, the Kenesset HaGedola and the Radvaz maintain that we must follow the Poskim against the Zohar.
The Petah HaDevir[16] and the Shemesh U’Magen[17] argue, pointing to the fact that Maran tried to make the opinion of the Zohar and the Poskim conform with one another, as an indication that we must follow the Poskim – not the Zohar – even according to Maran.
Arizal vs. Maran
The Hida in Birke Yosef writes[18], regarding the Beracha of “HaNoten La’Ya’ef Koah”, that although Maran in Shulhan Aruch rules that it should be recited without the name of Hashem, nevertheless we recite it with the name of Hashem following the writings of the Arizal. This, asserts the Hida, is despite the fact the we have accepted Maran’s rulings as the binding Halacha, as we can assume that Maran would have retracted his ruling had he seen the writings of the Arizal.
Furthermore, whereas the Poskim will occasionally instruct not to recite specific Berachot, even against Maran’s opinion, based on the rule of Safek Berachot L’Hakel (when in doubt we refrain from reciting a Beracha), that is not the case against the rulings of the Arizal. If the writings of the Arizal are of the opinion that a specific Beracha must be recited, we will rely on that even if the other Poskim are inconclusive.[19]
This begs the question: why are we favoring the Arizal’s opinion over that of Maran? We have obviously accepted the rulings of Maran as Halacha, if so let us not be in doubt where Maran issued an explicit ruling! We must inquire further: even if we were to accord superiority to the writings of the Arizal because of the Arizal’s unparalleled level of Ruah HaKodesh, don’t we have a rule in Halacha, “Lo BaShamayim Hi” – Halachic matters are to be analyzed through logic and human capacity alone, not through the use of Heavenly means – such as Giluy Eliyahu, Ruah HaKoodesh and the like?[20]
The Ohr L’Tziyon’s Distinction
To address the first issue, the Ohr L’Tziyon writes[21], that our acceptance of Maran’s rulings was meant as the general directive (הנהגה) and not the absolute conclusion (הכרעה). This is why, although when Maran cites two opinions we follow the one mentioned plainly (סתם), it is nevertheless preferable to be strict like the second opinion, when possible. This, however, is not the case with regards to the Arizal’s writings which were accepted as absolute truths. In the case of the latter, says the Ohr L’Tziyon, we will not be in doubt, despite the disputes of the rest of the Poskim.
With regards to our second point, the Poskim distinguish between using Ruah HaKodesh and the like to determine Halachic matters – which is not acceptable, and simply trusting the opinion of a sage who has reached tremendously high levels of Ruah HaKodesh, such as the Arizal. The Hida, in Shem HaGedolim[22], uses this distinction to explain why there seem to be places where we do rely on a Posek’s Ruah HaKodesh to decide a Halachic matter. Similarly, Hacham Ovadia Yosef writes[23] that we would rely on the rulings of Eliyahu HaNavi – not because they are issued with prophetic knowledge – but rather because of the gravitas his tremendous stature lends to his opinions.
In Conclusion
- If the Zohar and the Talmud seem to disagree we follow the Talmud.
- If the Zohar and the Poskim seem to disagree: the Kenesset HaGedola cited in Mishna Berura and the Radvaz follow the Poskim, as is the conclusion of Hacham Ovadia Yosef, whereas it seems that the Bet Yosef would follow the Zohar, as is the conclusion of Hacham Mordechai Eliyahu, Emek Yehoshua and others. The Petah HaDevir and Ribbi Shalom Messass distinguish between where all the Poskim argue on the Zohar, in which case we follow the Poskim, and where only some of the Poskim argue on the Zohar, in which case we will rely on the Zohar.
- If the Arizal rules in a matter of Berachot would do not worry about the doubts of other Poskim.[24]
- If the Mekubalim are stricter than the Poskim, the Kenesset HaGedola as well as the Hida in many places follow the stringencies of the Mekubalim.
[1] Adapted from Rabbi Lebhar’s Sefer “Magen Avot” on Yore De’ah, Shoresh 5
[2] או”ח סי’ כה
[3] שם ד״ה האגור
[4] או”ח סי’ כז ס”ב
[5] שם סי’ לא ס”ב
[6] ב”י או”ח סי’ נ
[7] בסי’ לב ששיער התפילין יראה חוץ לבתים, בסי’ נט שאין היחיד אומר קדושת יוצר, בסי’ סא שחוזר לומר ה’ אלוקיכם אמת, בסי’ סו שלא לענות אמן אחר גאל ישראל, בסי’ קא (בבדה”ב) שלא להתפלל אם קולו נשמע, ע”ש בפוסקים, בסי’ קכה לעניין נט”י לכהנים, ביו”ד סי’ רפח לעניין כתיבת שם שד”י על המזוזה מבחוץ, ועוד כהנה וכהנה (ע’ במבוא לח”א של שו”ת מאמר מרדכי להגר”מ אליהו זצ”ל שהאריך במקורות לזה).
[8] או”ח סי’ קמא
[9] ב”ב ט”ו ע”א ד”ה ח’ פסוקים
[10] תשובות כלל ג’ סי’ יב
[11] שיירי כנה”ג, כללי הפוסקים
[12] סי’ כה ס”ק מב [אך יעו”ש שהביא את דברי המהרש”ל בתשובה סי’ צח, בשם ר”ש מקינון דלא אזלי’ בתר הקבלה אם אינו בקי בחדריה שמא יקצץ בנטיעות, וכן דעת פמ”ג. יא”ע]
[13] שו”ת ח”ד סי’ טו
[14] ח”ד סי’ ב’ אות ו’
[15] במבוא לשו”ת מאמר מרדכי הנ”ל, וע”ע בשו”ת עמק יהושע ח”ב, בהערות שבסוף הספר
[16] סי’ כה
[17] ח”א סי’ יא
[18] או”ח סי’ מו
[19] וע’ שו״ת יוסף אומץ (פ’ כב) אודות ברכת נשים על מ”ע שהז״ג שנראה ודאי שאילו שלטו מאור עיני קדשו של מרן בתשובת רבינו מהר״י ממריוי״ש שיש לנשים לברך, ודאי כך היה פוסק, ע״כ. ולכא’ החיד״א אזיל בזה לשיטתו דיש לחוש לדברי האריז״ל ושי”ל דאילו ראה מרן את דברי האריז״ל הוי הדר ביה. וצ״ע הך כללא גופיה, מהיכ״ת דנשבוק דברי מר״ן משום דאילו ראה דברי האריז״ל וכו’, וכעי״ז הק’ בשו״ת שמ״ש ומגן דא״כ אין לדבר סוף שהו״ל למר״ן לחזור מהרבה דברים.
[20] עיין ברכ”י או”ח סי’ לב באריכות ובכתבי מהר”ץ חיות ח”א בתחילתו
[21] ח”ב במבוא
[22] מע’ י’ אות רכב
[23] יבי”א ח״א סו״ס מא
[24] ויש לדון אם דברי שאר המקובלים יכריעו נמי במקום הפוסקים