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Is there a concept of appealing a Bet Din’s decision in Halacha?
By Dayan Yitzhak Grossman
Introduction
In most modern judicial systems, a litigant who is unhappy with a ruling issued against him by a local or district court may request to have the case reexamined by a higher-level court. The higher court can then uphold, or override, the earlier decision of the lower court, which is known as the “appeals system.” Does the option of an appeal exist in the Torah system of judgment as well, i.e., when it comes to the decision of a Bet Din? May an appeal be made elsewhere by a litigant after a decision was rendered in one Bet Din?
At first glance, it would seem that the answer is no, as no explicit mention is made of such an option in the Gemara or Shulhan Aruch. The decision of Bet Din is usually assumed to be final. However, in truth, the issue is somewhat more complex, and there are sources that do seem to indicate that this may be a possibility. In this series, we will explore the various sources on the topic and attempt to discern whether this is indeed possible, and under what circumstances.
The first possible mention of such an option is made by the Sforno in his commentary on Humash. When Yitro, Moshe’s father-in-law, visits the Jewish people, and suggests the idea of appointing multiple judges to ease Moshe’s burden in dealing with every single dispute, he refers to creating “Sare alafim, sare me’ot, sare hamishim v’sare ‘asarot” – “officers of thousands, officers of hundreds, officers of fifties and officers of tens” (Shemot 18:21). Rashi cites Hazal who explain that this refers to a hierarchy of multiple levels of judges. The lowest level judges would each administer to the needs of groups of ten individuals, the next level judges would oversee the legalities of a total of fifty people, and so forth[1].
However, the nature of the relationship between the different level judges is still somewhat unclear: if the Sare ‘Asarot would advise the people, the other levels of judges should not be necessary! Although the simplest explanation is that the higher-level judges were needed for cases where the lower-level judges were unable to answer the question, the Sforno suggests that the cases began at the lowest level, but one who felt the verdict was unfair would go to the next level and “appeal” his case. If after that hearing one of the parties still felt the ruling was not fair, they would bring the case to the next level judge, and so forth. Such a system – parallel to today’s appeals system – would ensure that Moshe would only hear the toughest cases. However, this comment of the Sforno cannot necessarily serve as a Halachic basis for an appeals system, since the Sare ‘Asarot system which was employed in the Midbar does not directly parallel that of the system of Bate Din later developed by Halacha.
Does One Bet Din Review the Decisions of Another?
As mentioned, the Gemara does not address this issue directly. However, there are one or two passages that may be somewhat relevant to the question. The Gemara (Bava Batra 138b, Yevamot 106a) discusses whether a Bet Din must verify the background of a man and woman who apply for a Halitza[2]3 (the release of a deceased childless brother’s wife). According to Rava, they must do so, as another Bet Din who hears the case afterward will rely on the previous Bet Din’s investigation: “Bei Dina battar Bei Dina la dayke” – “a Bet Din does not investigate matters that have been dealt with in a another Bet Din”.
The simple interpretation of the Gemara is that in that this rule is simply descriptive of what occurs: a Bet Din will not question or review the ruling of another Bet Din. It does not seem to imply that a Bet Din is prevented from doing so. However, a number of Rishonim seem to interpret this statement as saying that a Bet Din is not supposed to review the decision of an earlier Bet Din.
Interpretations of the Rishonim
The Rosh seems to take this approach in a Teshuva (Teshuvot HaRosh 85:5), where he says he is surprised that his correspondents were asking him a question about the ruling of another Bet Din, as once that Bet Din has already ruled, it is impossible to issue an opposing P’sak, citing this Gemara as proof. Although the Rosh notes that the earlier Bet Din in that case consisted of “Anashim Gedolim V’Nichbadim” – great and esteemed individuals, many Aharonim claim that this does not affect the rule, and regardless of the stature of the first Bet Din, another Bet Din may not discuss the case again.
A similar ruling is issued by the Haze HaTenufa (which is attributed to the Rosh, cited in Bet Yosef H.M. 12:16), where he discusses one who won a case in Bet Din, whereupon the loser attempted to bring the case to another Bet Din. Here too, the author rules that the winner is not required to go a second time, or even respond at all. In addition, he says that the second Bet Din is not even permitted to listen to the case, since the first Bet Din had already ruled on the matter.
There is also a third Teshuva written by the Rosh, which is a bit harder to understand. He says that if two parties accepted the authority of a single Dayan to rule in their case as opposed to the usual three, may not retract their consent to the P’sak, even if they both agree to retract. This seems very difficult to understand: they are surely allowed to reach any compromise they wish to reach before going to a Bet Din, why then can’t they mutually agree to retract their consent?
The Bet Yosef raises this question and cites two possible answers. He prefers the second answer, that retracting their agreement to litigate in one Bet Din is a disrespect of its honor. The Rama in Darke Moshe argues that the issue of disrespect is irrelevant here: If the parties do not agree, then the ruling of the first Bet Din remains binding, and if they agree to a different compromise, then they are simply agreeing to a new deal, which is in no way a lack of respect to the Dayanim.
Still, the Bach and other Aharonim agree with the Bet Yosef, and rule that out of respect to the original Dayan, one may not go to another Bet Din or attempt to reach a separate resolution. The Bach explains that the Rosh means that even if the litigants disregard the prohibition and go to another Bet Din, the second Bet Din itself is not permitted to listen to the case. According to the Bach’s understanding of the Rosh, all three of his responsa revolve around the issue of Kavod Bet Din – honor of the Bet Din.
Thus, the Bet Yosef and Bach introduce a new dimension to the issue of appeals: We would think that the question of whether appeals are allowed according to the Halacha focuses on the rights of the litigant, who feels that he was not properly heard out in the first case, but according to this approach, there is also an additional concern of maintaining the honor of the first Bet Din as well!
This dual approach is adopted by the Hoshen Ha’Efod (H.M. 42) in addressing the appellate system in his day (see below for more on the background of his ruling). He claims that this idea originates in the responsa of the Hazeh HaTenufa, and rules that appeals are not permitted. He explains that this is both because the winning litigant should not need to reargue his case, plus the issue of Kavod Bet Din requires that we not disregard the first ruling, and that the Hazeh Tenufah accepted both of these ideas as true.
The Hoshen Ha’Efod also cites a Teshuva of the Edut B’Yaakov, who indicates that he is not concerned with the issue of Kavod Bet Din, but the Hoshen Ha’Efod says the Halacha does not follow this minority position. He elaborates that one might argue that the losing party may argue that he holds like the opinion of the Edut B’Yaakov to avoid paying (a concept known as “Kim Li” – invoking a minority opinion to keep your money). However, the Hoshen Ha’Efod refutes this, as no other Bet Din will be willing to take the case anyway, due to the consensus of most of the other Poskim. Therefore, the litigant will be forced to accept the first ruling.
Furthermore, argues the Hoshen Ha’Efod, the notion of “Kim Li” should not apply where it may infringe on the prohibition of disrespecting a Talmid Hacham. Therefore, the Choshen HaEfod concludes that one may not appeal a decision in Bet Din.
Another Teshuva cited by the Hoshen Ha’Efod and others is authored by the Ran, who apologizes to Dayanim for apparently issuing a ruling that he then discovered had been ruled upon by them already. He exclaims that had he known, he would have sent the litigant away, since one who argues against the ruling of Bet Din is meaningless. Clearly, the Ran maintains that this may not be done, and he too seems concerned about Kavod Bet Din, since he apologizes to the Bet Din, not to the litigants.
Sources:
[1] There are other explanations given for this as well. Ibn Ezra understands that the “thousands” and “hundreds” refer to the servants and helpers, not the people whom they were supposed to judge. Therefore, Sarei Alafim refers to prominent individuals who had thousands of servants or other staff, and Sarei Me’ot means those who had hundreds of servants.