Print this Article
Who is responsible for the damage wrought by Google’s Self Driving Car?
By: Rabbi Yosef Fund
Google Car Misses its Cue
Over the past several years of testing, Google’s fleet of autonomous vehicles have been involved in a number of minor accidents, but up until now, all of them were caused by human driven vehicles running into Google’s machines. This changed in February 2016, as an autonomous Lexus RX450h slowly ran into the side of Mountain View, California transit bus.
The Google car was apparently stopped by a construction barrier and was preparing to pull out into traffic. The Google car assumed that the oncoming bus would slow or stop, clearing the way. Unfortunately, the Google car has no way of detecting the bus driver’s intent from outside. While autonomous vehicles like Google’s prototypes can often see a lot more than human drivers and respond properly, they can miss things that we do pick up on.
A human driver would likely have looked over the shoulder and made eye contact with the bus driver, which have might have made altered his decision. This wasn’t a glitch: the car’s software made a decision that led to a crash. This is the first instance in which the autonomous car is at fault in an accident. According to Halacha, who is responsible to pay for damages when a self-driving car gets into an accident?
Collisions in Halacha
Not surprisingly, we do not find in the classic Halachic sources direct rulings regarding self-driving cars, but we do find precedents helpful to our discussion. The Ros”h[1], in his response, was asked about members of a wedding party who were riding together. At the head was the groom, riding gallantly on – of all things – a leased mule. One of the members raced his horse towards the groom, resulting in a horse on mule collision with damage to the mule.
The questioner mentioned as a possible argument that this having taken place in a public area, where all have permission to operate, places the burden of caution on the groom, and frees the racer of responsibility. Additionally, the questioner expressed his uncertainty as to whether the rider is to be considered the one who directly did the damage. Should this be comparable to one who damages another by shooting arrows – which is considered to be Adam HaMazik, a damage caused directly by a human – or to one whose livestock damages?[2]
The Ros”h rejected the argument that such racing is permitted in a public area, ruling that even a pedestrian may only run in a public area if they do so in a manner in which they would be able to come to a stop should they so need. Additionally, the Ros”h ruled that the rider who damaged with his horse is to be considered as one who damaged directly, not merely as an owner of an animal that damaged. He compared this to an animal that damages with the saddle that is upon it, which is still considered as having directly damaged[3]. Here too, although the rider did not damage with his own body, the horse he was riding is considered to be his direct extension, and the damage the horse would cause is linked directly to its rider. Nevertheless, the Ros”h adds that the one who raced would only be liable for the actual damage to the leased mule, not for any excess payment which, in that specific case, the owner demanded.
Hacham Ovadia Yosef זצ”ל in his responsa, Yehave Da’at[4], cites the Ros“h and adds that this is more the case with one who operates a car at an excess speed which makes him unable to bring the car to a short stop; should he collide he would be directly responsible. So, too, Pithe Hoshen[5], citing the Ros”h, rules that one who steps on the gas pedal of a car and sets in motion a series of actions and reactions is considered as the direct cause, as is one who activates a machine gun considered the cause of all the bullets that are released as a result of his initial activation.
The Reaction of a Self-Driving Car
In regards to self-driving-cars, it is important to note that – at the time of this writing – much of the behavior of the car is not a result of any action on the part of the original handler, but rather a reaction to other human drivers. In this case it would be comparable not as much to the case of the horse rider cited above, rather to one who left a stone in a place where a wind is liable to carry, in which case he is responsible[6] for damages whether caused while it is in motion,[7] or after it lands[8].
Where the self-driving car reacted to the actions of other self-driving cars it would be comparable to a stone or fire driven by the wind. The overall principle would be that if the other self-driving cars behaved as is to be expected it would be as a fire driven by a usual wind (רוח מצויה). If the other cars behaved in an atypical way, it would be as a fire blown by an unusual wind (רוח שאינה מצויה) in which case the one who started the fire would not bear responsibility.[9]
If the self-driven car reacted to other human drivers, then it would be comparable to one who left a stone in the public domain, in which it is bound to be kicked by humans as they walk, in which case they would bear responsibility only if they acted irresponsibly[10]. Also to be taken into consideration in all of these cases would be whether the self-driven cars reaction is one that is generally considered appropriate.
Inappropriate Use of a Shared Domain
It is important to qualify all of the above according to some general principles. According to Rambam[11], two who are both using a public domain in an acceptable way[12] are responsible for damage to each others’ property only when inflicted deliberately.
It would follow that a driver who damaged another’s car would not be liable if he was acting neither intentionally nor inappropriately[13]. For this purpose, appropriate use would be defined as generally accepted road behavior; a technical violation would not necessarily be considered misuse[14]. A properly programmed self-driving car would not, by definition, operate inappropriately, and certainly not deliberately (I hope). On the strength of this principle, Google could expect their well trained cars to be let off the hook in Bet Din.
Sources:
[1] Shu”t HaRos”h 100,5.
[2] The four categories of torts, in the first chapter of Bava Kama, are quite familiar. They are: 1. Adam – damage caused by a human, 2. Shor – damage caused by livestock, 3. Esh – damage caused by fire, and 4. Bor – damage caused by the creation of a pit. Each category has its unique characteristics and level of liability.
[3] Bava Kama 17b.
[4] 5, 16.
[5] Nezikin 3:1, end of subsection 5.
[6] Bava Kama 3b.
[7] As the tort of “Esh” – fire.
[8] As the tort of “Bor” – pit. It is important to note that a digger of a pit is responsible only for damage to life or limb not to inanimate property, Shulhan Aruch, Hoshen Mishpat 410:21 and 413:1.
[9] Ibid. 418.
[10] Sem”a 411:6.
[11] Hovel U’Mazik 6:3.
[12] Hazon Ish, Bava Kama 4:2.
[13] HaYashar V’Hatov 4:32.
[14] Ibid.