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Adapted from an article by Rabbi Micha Cohn
In recent decades, tremendous progress has been made in the field of mental health. Many conditions that have never been defined nor diagnosed are now household terms, and awareness of the importance of addressing mental health issues, and the people affected by it, has risen dramatically. In this article, we would like to discuss several Halachic concepts that pertain to the public conversation about mental capacity. At what point does mental incapacity exempt a person from Mitzvot or responsibility in Bet Din? When would they be considered incapable of giving a Get or conducting business?
A Minor and a Mentally Incapable Individual
The Talmud often states that a minor (kattan) or mentally-incapable person (shoteh) is exempt from Mitzvot. This concept has many far-reaching implications. For example, since a minor is not obligated in Mitzvot, there may not even be an obligation to withhold them from doing a transgression[1]. On the other hand, a minor is disqualified from performing functions that require one to be an adult, such as testifying in Bet Din, writing Tefillin and Mezuzot, selling property and more.
Likewise, defining whether an adult is obligated in Mitzvot or not due to his impaired mental status is a sensitive issue. Once we define someone as mentally impaired according to Halacha, they would be disqualified from performing functions requiring one to be an adult (whether or not it is permitted to place them in a non-kosher facility, is a discussion unto its own).
Defining Mental Incapacity
The Gemara in Hagiga[2] describes specific behaviors that classify a person as a “shoteh”: ‘One who walks alone at night, sleeps in the cemetery, tears his clothing and one who loses what is given to him’. According to Rashi and the Mei’ri[3] these definitions are the criteria for mental incompetence in all areas of Halacha. These authorities use the same standard to determine one’s obligation in Mitzvot, punishment in Bet Din, and capacity to conduct business.
Rabbenu Avigdor, a leading European Rishon in the 13th century, followed this approach very rigidly, maintaining that the aforementioned symptoms are the only defining factors of mental capacity according to Halacha. In a letter to his colleague, Rabbenu Meir, regarding a Get given in Wurzburg, Germany, Rabbenu Avigdor ruled that the Get was valid – despite concerns over the husband’s seeming mental instability – because he did not display the exact symptoms mentioned in the Gemara.
According to this school of thought, most mentally impaired individuals would not be classified as a shoteh. This would not only render their transactions valid, but would also consider them to be fully obligated in Mitzvot and punishable for their actions in Bet Din.
The Rambam’s Opinion and its Implications
However, the Rambam takes a more inclusive approach in defining the term shoteh, as he writes in Hilchot ‘Edut[4]: ‘A shoteh is not necessarily one who who walks about unclothed, breaks dishes and throws stones, rather, anyone whose mind is unstable (teruf) and is always confused about a specific matter is considered a “shoteh” even if they speak sensibly about other matters’. The implication of this is that – according to the Rambam – a person who is delusional in some aspect of their life, is considered to be a shoteh with regards to testifying in court. In the previous Halacha the Rambam seems to assert that the status of shoteh with regards to being a witness is the same standard with which we judge one’s obligation in Mitzvot.[5]
There are great implications to this debate between Rabbenu Avigdor and the Rambam. According to Rabbenu Avigdor, the term shoteh would only apply to one who demonstrates the specific behaviors mentioned in the Talmud, and thus would preclude most mentally ill individuals. While this view may allow a mentally ill husband to give a Get in many situations, it would also hold a broad spectrum of mentally ill people to be responsible for their actions. Conversely, in the view of the Rambam, it would seem that any delusional person would be incapable of giving a Get, executing a transaction, or bear responsibility for his or her actions.
The Mahari”t and the Get of Cleves
The Mahari”t (Ribbi Yosef ben Moshe Trani, Salonika 1568-1639) was one of the first to address the far-reaching implications of the Rambam’s position. The brother of a deceased husband had come before the Mahari”t to perform Halitza (an act permitting a widow of a childless man to remarry). The brother was of minimal intelligence and had slurred speech. Yet, the Mahari”t ruled that the brother had sufficient intelligence to perform Halitza since it was like a transaction which did not require the same level of understanding as testimony.
In his discussion of the matter, the Mahari”t makes a crucial observation about the opinion of the Rambam: it is possible that the Rambam’s broad definition of a shoteh only applies to one’s ability to testify. The capacity to give a Get, Halitzah, or execute other legal transactions should only require an understanding of what is presently taking place. According to this approach the Rambam and Rabbenu Avigdor could agree to a more relaxed standard of mental capacity for a Get – and disagree with regards to obligation in Mitzvot, testimony and other areas.
Some one hundred and fifty years later, a tremendous controversy erupted over a Get given by a young man, Yitzhak Newberg, in Cleves, Germany. Yitzhak suffered from delusional thoughts and the Bet Din of Frankfurt held him to be incapable of giving a Get. While he did not exhibit the symptoms mentioned in the Gemara, the Bet Din maintained that according to the Rambam’s view any persistent delusion would make a husband incompetent to give a Get.
However, the vast majority of Torah scholars at the time disagreed, and held the Get to be valid. Great luminaries such as the Noda Bi’Yehuda (Rav Yehezkel Landau of Prague) used a line of reasoning similar to that of the Mahari”t to validate the Get even according to the Rambam. Because Yitzhak Newberg’s delusions did not compromise his ability to understand the consequences of him giving a Get, he was to be considered completely competent and the Get would be valid[6].
The Man Who Mistook Himself for Mashiah
Dealing with a similar issue, Rav Moshe Feinstein זצ”ל was asked in 1929 whether a delusional young man who professed to be Mashiah had the capacity to give a Get. Still in his thirties, Rav Moshe’s brilliant response is almost identical to that of the Noda Bi’Yehuda’s nearly two hundred years earlier (during the ‘Get of Cleves’ controversy).
While defining mental capacity for Mitzvot and punishment in Bet Din is not the focus of Rav Moshe’s response, he addresses this point as well. Rav Moshe points out, that the reason the Rambam gives for disqualifying a shoteh from testimony is because he is not obligated in Mitzvot. It is clear then, that one’s obligation to perform Mitzvot is subject to the same inclusive definition of shoteh as witnesses are. Rav Moshe explains that this is because any person who is not mentally capable of observing some Mitzvot, is also exempt from all of the Mitzvot, as the Torah only obligated a person in Mitzvot when they are capable to perform all of them.
On this last point however, the Noda Bi’Yehuda disagrees with Rav Moshe, and maintains that the Rambam would only exempt a mild shoteh from the specific Mitzvot pertaining to his area of deficiency. Any Mitzva which the shoteh can be held accountable for, would indeed be expected of them. Still, argues the Noda Bi’Yehuda, this semi-obligation in Mitzvot is sufficient to disqualify one from being a witness.
Needless to say, due to the serious and complex nature of these matters, this article is intended for educational purposes only and is not meant to issue any Halachic ruling. Please consult with a Posek with regards to the Halacha L’Ma’aseh.
[1] יבמות קיד ע”א, ע’ רמב”ם פכ”ד מהל’ שבת הי”א ופי”ז מהל’ מאכ”א הכ”ז, ובשו”ע או”ח סי’ שמג ס”א, וש”ך יו”ד סי’ פא סקכ”ו
[2] ג’ ע”ב
[3] שם
[4] פ”ט ה”ט -י”א
[5] וכן הבינו בדבריו בשו”ת דברי יוסף, נפש חיה, צמח צדק ובחי’ אבהא”ז
[6] תשובות הגאונים בעניין הגט מקליווא נלקטו בס’ אור הישר.