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Adapted from the writings of Rav Ariel Ovadia
Is a facilitator liable for the actions of others?
People of the ‘book
In the past 30 days, 3 out of every 10 people on the planet—some 2,227,000,000 souls—accessed their Facebook accounts. This is a staggering fact.
On November 27, at the inaugural hearing of the “International Grand Committee on Disinformation” in London, lawmakers from nine countries took turns castigating Zuckerberg and his company for disseminating “fake news.” Not showing up for the meeting probably didn’t help his case.
Arguably, the company’s troubles are largely self-inflicted. Along with other social media companies, it chose not to be a passive forum where users publish what they will. Instead, it actively polices its platform, banning and promoting viewpoints according to its own values and politics.
By contrast, there are other services that provide a forum for communication but do not concern themselves with its content. Phone companies take no interest in what is said on their lines, so it occurs to no one to punish them for the activities of prank callers or telemarketers or terrorists planning attacks. Ditto for email providers and the postal service. Because these entities claim no jurisdiction over the content they transmit, they are not held accountable for it.
From the Torah perspective, which approach is correct? If I hang a bulletin board, must I monitor what is posted there?
Lifne Iver
The Torah (VaYikra 19:14) prohibits placing a stumbling block before a blind man. This means that one may not create an opportunity for another Jew to sin (Avoda Zara 6a). Hachamim prohibited Mesayea LiDvar Avera, assisting in a transgression, even where the sinner could have done it on his own (Tosafot and Rosh, Shabbat 3a).
While the Shach (Y.D. 151:6) is lenient in the case of a Mesayea to a Mumar (one who completely disregards Torah law), this doesn’t seem to be the consensus of the Aharonim (see Dagul M’Revava ad loc.).
Hall Monitor
The owner of a wedding hall asked R’ Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe Y.D. 1:72) whether he could rent his facility to people who would serve non-kosher food or have mixed dancing at their event. R’ Moshe replied that this is permitted because the hall will not be the cause of the Avera, only its location. Otherwise, he argues, why doesn’t Halacha forbid the sale of dishes to Jews who don’t keep kosher?
Facebook, it would seem, is no worse than a ballroom owner.
Feed the Evildoer
A similar scenario is discussed in the Mishna in Ma’aser Sheni (5:1). R’ Shimon Ben Gamliel says that outside of the Shemita year (when all may freely enter any field and eat its produce) one doesn’t have to make it known to the public that the fruit of his vineyard is forbidden because of Kerem Revai (fruits of the 4th year) or ‘Orla (fruits of the first 3 years). The Gemara in Bava Kama (69a) explains that we follow the maxim Hal’itehu LaRasha V’Yamut—“feed the evildoer and he will die.” I need not see to it that someone who will steal my grapes doesn’t violate additional prohibitions. The Rambam codifies this in Hilchot Ma’aser Sheni (9:7).
There is a debate among the Aharonim how far this principle goes.
The Rash Sirilio holds the most lenient view, that one never has to be concerned about the potential additional transgression of an evildoer.
The Hazon Ish (Demai 8:9) writes that the Mishna is only lenient where the potential violator would have to steal the item with which he would transgress.
R’ Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Minhat Shelomo, Bava Kama ibid.) and other Aharonim maintain that so long as one is not partaking in the Avera actively, he is exempt, so he is not required to intervene.
The most stringent view is that of the Havot Ya’ir (142), who forbade placing non-kosher food in a place where it could be stolen and eaten by a Jew.
(A jarring story, recorded in Kovetz Pa’amei Yaakov, demonstrates how far the approach of the Hazon Ish can legitimately be taken: A chemist had his lunch stolen every day at work. To unmask the thief, he put poison in his food, put it in the office fridge, and waited to see which of his co-workers developed symptoms. When the culprit got sick, the triumphant chemist administered the antidote, doubtless sure he had lost his lunch for the last time. R’ Yitzchok Zilberstein, asked about the incident, concluded that allowing the thief to harm himself was permitted based on the “feed the evildoer” concept. R’ Chaim Kanievsky concurred.)
Our Facebook question would seem to hinge on this dispute: According to the Hazon Ish, because the service enables forbidden conduct, it is the provider’s responsibility to prevent it. To R’ Shlomo Zalman, however, because the sinner is helping himself, as it were, one need not intervene. It would seem that even the Hazon Ish would agree if the platform’s rules forbade the behavior in question.
Arvut
We are all Arevim (guarantors) for each other’s Torah observance. Would that require us to prevent another’s violation in a case like ours? R’ Yerucham Fischel Perla (Parasha 57) and other Aharonim understand that Arvut doesn’t apply when a person is in any case transgressing other prohibitions. Additionally, R’ Yitzhak Elhanan Spektor (Ein Yitzhak O.H. 1:11) writes that Arvut only applies when one knows that a sin is being committed.
Going Beyond
The Mishna in Ma’aser Sheni concludes that the pious would always refrain from causing other people to sin, even where it is permitted and even at a cost to themselves. The Rambam cites this, and Igrot Moshe (O.H. 1:52) writes that one should strive to attain this level.
In conclusion: If you establish a communications platform and you publish rules that ban forbidden speech, you are not required to intervene against violators (unless someone is endangered). Nevertheless, it is an act of piety to do so.